Top photo Credit: Adobe Express
In late December 2025, a federal district court in Massachusetts issued a decision that is already rippling through the biosolids and composting industries. The case focused on pelletized biosolids used as fertilizer that contain per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The court held that these pellets qualify as a “useful product” under Massachusetts’s analogue to the federal Superfund law.
At first glance, that phrase may sound like a green light. It is not.
The ruling does not determine whether PFAS in biosolids is safe. It does not change any state or federal standards governing land application – and it does not resolve the broader debate over how the waste and wastewater sectors should manage PFAS. Instead, the decision addresses a narrower legal question about liability under Massachusetts’ version of Federal CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, also known as Superfund).
Under Superfund law, companies can be held liable as an “arranger” if they “arranged for disposal” of hazardous substances. For decades, courts have recognized what is known as the useful product defense. When a company sells a legitimate product for its intended use, rather than attempting to discard waste, it may not be considered an arranger under the law.
In this case, the court concluded that the pelletized biosolids were marketed and sold as a fertilizer product, not as a means of waste disposal. As a result, the defendants could invoke the useful product defense against arranger liability under Massachusetts law.
Environmental attorney Matthew Karmel, Principal and Chair of the Environmental and Sustainability Practice Group at Offit Kurman, who regularly represents members of the organics recycling industry, notes that the ruling does not eliminate potential liability for companies involved in producing or distributing biosolids products. “These parties could still have liability under common law, including negligence and other tort theories but these concepts are nuanced and state-specific,” he explains. “They could also face liability under state environmental laws, as not all states recognize the CERCLA ‘useful product’ defense. The same defense and reasoning should apply to anyone involved in the production and application of the ‘product.’ All in all, the decision likely does shift liability onto the owner of the property where the product was applied, but the amount of the shift will depend on many factors.”
However, the court’s analysis did not stop there. It also found that one of the defendants knowingly distributed pelletized biosolids containing PFAS and, in so doing, did not break the causal chain where it should have anticipated downstream disposal practices and their consequences. In other words, while the pellets were treated as a product rather than waste for purposes of arranger liability, the court acknowledged that distributing materials known to contain PFAS could still carry legal consequences in other contexts.
That nuance is significant. The ruling offers clarity on one legal pathway, but it does not shield biosolids from scrutiny. If anything, it reinforces the importance of understanding what is present in the materials being produced and distributed, and how those materials may be used downstream by product users.
The decision also arrives amid a rapidly evolving regulatory landscape. Several states have adopted stricter PFAS limits for biosolids, and Maine has effectively curtailed land application of biosolids in response to contamination concerns. At the federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed designating certain PFAS compounds as hazardous substances under CERCLA. If finalized, that move could significantly reshape liability exposure nationwide.
Because the Massachusetts case interprets the state’s analogue to CERCLA, its geographic reach is limited. The ruling does not bind courts in other states, and it does not determine how federal courts might interpret arranger liability under federal law, particularly if PFAS compounds are formally listed as hazardous substances.
Even so, the decision may influence how companies evaluate risk. Some in the organics recycling sector have historically taken a cautious approach to PFAS testing, concerned that generating data on PFAS concentrations could increase liability. The court’s emphasis on knowledge and foreseeability complicates that calculus. In an era when PFAS contamination is widely documented and increasingly regulated, failing to understand what is present in feedstocks may offer little legal protection.
Ultimately, the Massachusetts decision highlights a broader tension facing the industry. Biosolids are marketed as products that return nutrients to soil and support a circular economy. At the same time, the presence of persistent synthetic chemicals challenges that narrative. Courts may be willing to treat pelletized biosolids as useful products for purposes of arranger liability. But regulators, lawmakers, and the public are still grappling with whether and how PFAS-containing materials should be land applied.
For now, the ruling narrows one avenue of liability without closing the larger conversation. The future of biosolids in a PFAS-constrained world will likely depend less on this single decision and more on evolving federal designations, state level restrictions, and the industry’s willingness to confront contamination risks directly.
